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The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has experienced complex warfare that 
has involved various neighboring nations beginning in the mid-1990s. In particular, the 
protected presence of armed groups has been a major obstacle to peace. Based on the best 
practices in Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration (DDR) programs, this thesis 
constructs an analytical framework and uses a longitudinal case study of the DRC to 
analyze four DDR programs initiated in the DRC from 2002 to 2009, with the goal of 
better understanding why they failed. The thesis finds that an unrealistically short 
timeline, insufficient funds, an overemphasis on disarmament, and the failure to include 
all key warring parties in the DDR process created major obstacles to success in short-
term DDR efforts in the DRC. Long-term reintegration efforts have been hindered by 
poor linkages between the DDR and security sector reform (SSR), a lack of government 
capacity to implement and oversee reintegration programs, a chronically weak economic 
sector, and continued tensions with DRC’s neighbors, particularly Rwanda. Given these 
findings, implementing a viable DDR program should require a minimum of 15 years of 
commitment; this would allow for comprehensive SSR, jobs programs, community-based 
activism, an improved economy, and better relations with neighboring countries. 
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The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has experienced warfare that has 
involved various neighboring nations since the mid-1990s. In the eastern part of the 
country, the protracted presence of foreign armed groups, Congolese militias, and rebel 
forces further complicated the situation in the DRC and have become a major obstacle to 
peace and security. These armed groups have violated human rights, including murder, 
kidnapping, torture of civilians, recruitment of children as soldiers, and demolishing 
houses or settlements by fire.1 In addition to these atrocities, mass rapes and sexual 
punishment have also been applied as weapons against the population. The conflict has 
affected millions of lives, and millions died since the onset of the Congo war.2  
In an effort to halt the warfare, the DRC signed the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement 
in July 1999.3 This landmark agreement led the UN Security Council to pass Resolution 
1279 on November 30, 1999, which established the United Nations Organization Mission 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), with the goal of helping to facilitate 
the ceasefire agreement and disengage all warring parties. Three years later, on December 
17, 2002, the main Congolese faction signed the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement, 
which called for a program of Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR) 
of ex-combatants.4  
DDR programs are typically implemented to assist ex-combatants in transitioning 
from military to civilian life. The main goal of the DDR program in Congo was to 
establish an environment conducive to peace and to restore security, which in turn, would 
                                                 
1 “Congo (DR) Conflict,” Thomson Reuters Foundation News, last modified December 9, 2013, 
http://news.trust.org/spotlight/Congo-DR-conflict/?tab=background. 
2 “Ending Impunity for Sexual Violence,” Human Rights Watch: Democratic Republic of Congo, June 
10, 2014, https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/10/democratic-republic-congo-ending-impunity-sexual-
violence.  
3 Jeanne M. Haskin, The Tragic State of the Congo: From Decolonization to Dictatorship (New York, 
NY: Algora Publishing, 2005), 131–133, https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/. 
4 Ibid., 132–133. 
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allow the Congolese government to set the prerequisite terms to reduce poverty and 
uphold economic development.5 With international support, the DRC created four 
distinct DDR programs with the goal of ending hostilities in the country: a DDR 
Reintegration and Resettlement (RR) program aimed at repatriating foreign fighters; two 
national programs aimed at demobilizing a variety of Congolese rebel and militia groups; 
and one program that focused specifically on the province of Ituri.  
Despite efforts to end hostilities and stabilize the state, the population has 
continued to experience insecurities and violence that has prevented civilians from 
performing daily activities, such as attending schools and engaging in the economy. 
Hostilities in the eastern part of the DRC have been particularly bad, and new armed 
groups have emerged despite the peace accords and DDR programs. Ultimately, the 
protracted violence and lack of security within the country and region demonstrate that 
these DDR programs were unsuccessful, especially as ex-combatants returned to their 
original job as fighters.  
B. THESIS QUESTION 
This thesis seeks to examine the following question: why did the DDR (RR) 
programs fail in the Democratic Republic of Congo?  
C. METHODOLOGY 
To investigate this question, this thesis uses a longitudinal case study to analyze 
the DDR programs in the DRC from 2002 to 2009. The thesis begins by reviewing the 
literature on best practices of DDR and will construct a framework with which to analyze 
the DDR program in the DRC. In particular, this thesis considers the following questions 
and their corresponding measures of effectiveness to analyze factors that might have led 
to the failure of DDR in the DRC: 
 What measures were taken to ensure security, law, and justice throuughout 
the country? What were the shortcomings of these efforts? 
                                                 
5 Jean A.P. Clément, Postconflict Economics in Sub-Saharan Africa: Lessons from the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Volume 2 of Studies in Methods - United Nations, International Monetary Fund, 2004, 
https://books.google.com/books? 
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 What economic opportunities existed for ex-combatants and the general 
population more broadly? What long-term efforts were undertaken to 
reintegrate ex-combatants into civilian life? If vocational training, 
education, and job assistance were offered, how successful were they and 
how was progress monitored?  
 What efforts were initiated to establish good relations with neighboring 
countries?  
This thesis focuses on how security, law and justice, economic opportunity, and 
regional relations were considered, if at all, in the DRC and what barriers prevented 
positive results from being achieved by the four DDR programs that were initiated to 
sustain peace and security in the DRC after the 2002 Pretoria Peace Agreement.  
D. FINDINGS 
This thesis finds that an unrealistically short timeline, insufficient funds, an 
overemphasis on disarmament, and the failure to include all key warring parties in the 
DDR process created major obstacles for even short-term efforts to demobilize armed 
individuals and groups in the DRC. Long-term reintegration efforts have been hindered 
by poor linkages between DDR and security sector reform and the continued need for ad 
hoc community-based security to fill the gap created by insufficient and poorly trained 
government forces. Long-term efforts at reintegrating former soldiers into civilian life 
also have been hampered by a lack of government institutions and an insufficient 
capacity to implement and oversee reintegration programs. Morevoer, a chronically weak 
economic sector and lack of jobs, along with continued tension with DRC’s neighbors, 
particularly Rwanda, have prevented DDR sucesses.  
Given these findings, this thesis proposes that the timeframe for effective 
DDR(RR) programs in the DRC should be a minimum of 15 years to allow enough time 
to conduct a comprehensive program that includes security sector reform, jobs programs, 
community-based activism, a focus on the economy, and improved relations with the 
DRC’s neighboring countries.  
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E. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
The thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter II provides an overview of literature on 
DDR, focusing on the basic steps of the program and their purpose. From this discussion, 
the thesis proposes a framework for analyzing the DDR programs in the DRC, focusing 
on security, law and justice; economic opportunity; and good relations with neighboring 
countries—as well as their corresponding measures of effectiveness—to better 
understand what led to the failure of DDR programs in the DRC. Chapter III provides 
background on the wars in the DRC, the peace accords created to halt hostilities, and 
various efforts to restore peace and stability through DDR programs. Chapter IV uses the 
framework from Chapter II to provide an analysis of the DDR programs in the DRC, and 
concludes with recommendations for strengthening DDR efforts in the DRC moving 




II. DDR PROGRAMS AND STABILIZING FRAGILE STATES 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) processes aim to 
transition legally and illegally armed individuals from combatants to civilian life.6 DDR, 
sometimes referred as DDR(RR) after adding the concepts of Repatriation and 
Rehabilitation, can include social and economic development, humanitarian assistance, 
politics, security measures, and the creation or retraining of armed forces.7 According to 
the UN’s DDR Resources Center, “the objective of the DDR process is to contribute to 
security and stability in post-conflict environments so that recovery and development can 
begin.”8 DDR, in other words, is an integral part of peacebuilding and sustainable 
development in post-conflict environments.9  
Successful DDR programs, however, require notable time, resources, and clear 
goals to be successful. The effectiveness of the DDR program depends on the ability of 
the state to promote humanitarian assistance, economic and social development, armed 
forces, and security for the political arena in building a nation.10 In post-conflict 
countries, these very aspects of the state are often weak and ineffective, making 
implementation of DDR programs difficult and often unsuccessful.  
This chapter outlines each of the steps in the DDR(RR) process, noting the 
different goals and challenges in each step. The chapter focuses specifically on the 
                                                 
6 W. Andy Knight, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding 
in Africa an Overview,” African Security 1, no.1 (2008): 27, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/
19362200802285757.  
7 Albert Caramés, Vicenç Fisas Armengol, and Daniel Luz, “Analysis of Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) Existing in the World during 2005,” February 2006, Escola de 
Cultura de Pau. http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/desarme/ddr001i.pdf. 
8 “What Is DDR?” United Nations Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Centre. 
accessed February 25, 2016, http://www.unddr.org/what-is-ddr/introduction_1.aspx.  
9 Alan Bryden and Vincenza Scherrer, “The DDR_SSR Nexus: Concepts and Policies,” in 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration and Security Sector Reform. Insights from UN Experience 
in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo, ed. Alan Bryden, 
Vincenza Scherrer (Vienna: LIT Verlag GmbH & Co., 2012), 5.  
10 Knight, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in 
Africa,” 28.  
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Reintegration phase of the DDR process and outlines the social and governmental 
resources necessary for long-term success in demobilizing illegally armed combatants 
after internal conflicts. 
B. WHAT IS DDR?  
Typically, DDR programs begin with a call for ex-combatants to disarm. The 
rationale behind disarmament is that ex-combatants with weapons pose security threats to 
the state, civilians, and countries bordering the conflict state. The UN mission’s scheme 
paved the way for development activities that are intended to bestow stability and 
security in a country recovering from war and to rejuvenate the society, politics, and 
economy.11 The disarmament component of DDR usually includes sorting, controlling, 
recording, verifying, and destroying weapons and explosives.12 In some cases, ex-
combatants are given cash for their arms in a “buy back program.”13 In Sierra Leone, for 
example, ex-combatants were paid USD 150 cash for surrendering any weapon.14 Neutral 
international agencies and technical assistance can promote the planning and 
implementation of the demilitarization process.15 For example, the United Nations 
Monitoring Mission for Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) performed the overall task of 
disarmament in both countries.16  
Demobilization is a course of action for regulating and controlling the 
transformation of former soldiers from combatant to noncombatant status.17 
Demobilization often starts with disarmed ex-combatants being confined to designated 
                                                 
11 Ibid., 28. 
12 Martin Edmonds, Greg Mills, and Terence McNamee, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration and Local Ownership in the Great Lakes: The Experience of Rwanda, Burundi, and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo,” African Security 2, no. 1 (2009): 33, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/
19362200902766383.  
13 Nat J. Coletta, Markus Kostner, and Ingo Wiederhofer, “Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration: Lessons and Liabilities in Reconstruction,” In When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, 
ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 173.  
14 Ibid., 173.  
15 Ibid., 173. 
16 Ibid., 173 
17 Ibid., 173. 
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centers or camps before being returned to society.18 In addition to persuading the former 
combatants to lay down weapons and stop fighting, neutral international agencies provide 
a variety of assistance in the form of financial support, job offers, or technical tools that 
help them to begin a new life.19 Also, these programs often provide opportunities for the 
government to compile information and figures on the social wellbeing and economic 
development of the former soldiers, which the government can use to remove the 
obstacles that prevent these individuals from restarting noncombatant life.20 For example, 
during the demobilization phase in Uganda, the state discovered that 17 percent of the 
former soldiers were infected with HIV/AIDS; to re-integrate those soldiers, the DDR 
program added a medical package.21 
Reinsertion is a preparatory step in the rehabilitation process that provides moral 
and psychological support to ex-combatants during the demobilization period. The goal 
of the activity is to provide supportive means to former soldiers and sometimes to their 
families for a short period. Tangible support can include food, clothing, shelter, health 
care, mental development, and technical training.22 Often international organizations can 
provide these immediate and short-term necessities. 
Reintegration refers to the ways and means to strengthen skills and capabilities of 
former soldiers that contribute to these individuals achieving social and economic 
reintegration. This phase of the program may provide skills for self-employment and 
assistance finding a regular job, or economic assistance.23 In East Timor, for example, the 
government offered four reintegration packages to former combatants, including coastal 
                                                 
18 Edmonds, Mills, and McNamee, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local 
Ownership in the Great Lakes,” 33.  
19 Kimberly Theidon, “Transitional Subjects: The Disarmament, Demobilization, and the 
Reintegration of Former Combatants in Colombia,” The International Journal of Transitional Justice, 1, 
(2007): 66–90, doi:10.1093/ijtj/ijm011. 
20 Coletta, Kostner, and Wiederhofer, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,” 174.  
21 Ibid., 174. 
22 Edmonds, Mills, and McNamee, “Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Local 
Ownership in the Great Lakes,” 33.  
23 Theidon, “Transitional Subjects,” 71.  
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fishing, small urban micro-enterprises, ranching, and uplands agriculture.24 Reintegration 
is typically the most expensive and time-consuming stage in the DDR process and, if 
done well, successfully transitions fighters back to being peaceful and productive 
citizens. 
In some cases, additional steps to the DDR program are added, including 
repatriation and resettlement of foreign combatants. For example, MONUC was 
responsible for registering foreign civilian refugees from Rwanda, Uganda, and South 
Sudan, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was responsible for 
repatriating foreign civilians and armed forces.25 The Rwanda Demobilization and 
Reintegration Commission was in charge of the resettlement of ex-combatants from 
Rwanda, the Ugandan Amnesty Commission was accountable for the relocation of 
Ugandan armed forces, and the South Sudan Commission for DDR was in charge of 
troops from South Sudan.26  
C. LONG-TERM REINTEGRATION AND FRAGILE STATES 
The reintegration phase in DDR programs, in particular, is the hardest part of 
effectively transitioning fighters to civilian life because implementing these programs 
requires a functioning government and healthy social and political institutions to work 
together. Almost by definition, post-conflict states are politically and socially weak; they 
have gone through a violent collapse of the state, and new leaders have emerged with the 
goal of rebuilding state institutions that collapsed during the war period. Reconstructing 
the country is no small task—it requires leaders, individuals, and groups committed to the 
process of state formation.27  
Several scholars posit the necessary components and institutions of the state that 
need repair following collapsed or conflict ridden states. Jens Meierhenrich, for example, 
                                                 
24 Coletta, Kostner, and Wiederhofer, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration,”176. 
25 “DDR/RR Partners,” United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo, accessed 
March 12, 2016, http://monusco.unmissions.org/en/ddrrr-partners.html.  
26 Ibid.  
27 Jens Meierhenrich, “Forming States After Failure,” in When States Fail: Causes and 
Consequences, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 154.  
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argues that the formation of a state after state failure depends on the interests of the 
decision makers, population, and stakeholders in establishing a functioning government. 
The new state is fragile because it has absorbed various people with differing interests 
and goals. Members need to form strong formal institutions that promote power, security, 
and wealth in society.28 Meierhenrich notes that rebuilding the state requires the creation 
of strong formal institutions to develop representation, rights, power, influence and other 
valuable resources centered on the rule of law and bureaucracy. Legal systems and 
bureaucratic administration enable governments to exercise power and perform duties; 
weak or absent management, in turn, will lead the state to collapse.29 Ultimately, when 
done successfully, formal institutions govern the social order in society and allow the 
state to prosper. Ultimately, these formal and informal institutions take time to grow. 
Implementing a successful DDR program in the absence of these institutions will most 
likely be challenging.  
Ashraf Ghani et al. argue that healthy functioning states perform ten core 
functions that provide well-being for the population and build legitimacy between the 
government and the people.30 These ten functions begin with a monopoly on the 
legitimate means of violence through a simple system, well organized with power to 
control violence throughout the country.31 Second, administrative control is the capacity 
of the government to reach across its territory.32 The state can achieve administrative 
control through a coherent set of rules that regulates and divides responsibilities from the 
top down and across the state.33 Management of public finance is the third role of the 
state, with the sovereignty of a state measured through the management of public funds.34  
                                                 
28 Ibid., 154.  
29 Ibid., 155–158.  
30 Ashraf Ghani, Clare Lockhart, and Michael Carnahan, “Closing the Sovereignty Gap: An Approach 
to State-building,” Overseas Development Institute, September 2005, https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/
files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/2482.pdf. 
31 Ibid., 6.  
32 Ibid., 7. 
33 Ibid., 7. 
34 Ibid., 7. 
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An investment in human capital is the fourth function of a state. Human capital is 
crucial in building the capability for citizens to engage in economic, social, and 
development activities for the well-being of the country and population.35 Fifth, robust 
state functions must protect and communicate the rights and duties of the citizens, 
regardless of economic status, tribe/ethnic group, gender or religious affiliation. 
Investment in the state’s infrastructure is the sixth function; when done well, it promotes 
equal opportunity across the country, and reduces the migration of people to urban 
centers to seek services and abandon the rural areas.36 Formation of the market is the 
seventh function of a healthy state, and offers citizens the privilege to own property, to 
implement agreements at regional or international level, and to construct corporate, 
insurance, bankruptcy, land, employment, and environmental laws.37  
Management of state assets is the eighth function of a healthy state, according to 
Ghani et al. This function includes the ability to regulate and license companies, 
corporations, individuals, and a country’s natural resources with the goal of creating 
wealth in the state.38 Engagement in international relations is the ninth function of the 
state, which enables states to form relationships with other countries, international bodies, 
and private agencies. These relationships, in turn, provide the opportunity to form 
treaties, make investments in human capital, develop international legal norms, and 
borrow money or ask for development aid.39  
The rule of law is the tenth function, which is the capability to align formal and 
informal rules of the state.40 Like Meierhenrich, Ghani et al. argue that stable policies 
nurture rule of law, as do a rotation of rulers and the persistence of legal systems from 
one administration to the next. These norms and practices are among the critical 
                                                 
35 Ibid., 7. 
36 Ibid., 8. 
37 Ibid., 8. 
38 Ibid., 8. 
39 Ibid., 8. 
40 Ibid., 9. 
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measurements of democracy, and these norms and practices allow the populace to choose 
its leaders. The rule of law also increases the overall credibility of the government.41  
Ghani et al. stress that the integration of these ten functions by the government 
creates moral empowerment and opportunity for the population, which builds trust 
between the government and populace in turn.42 Conversely, the inability to perform one 
or many of these functions leads to contradictions, ineffective decision making, and a 
lack of trust between the government and the population, which could cause unrest or 
insurgency.43  
From this discussion, it is clear that states need the following resources to 
implement the successful reintegration of ex-combatants following prolonged internal 
conflict: 
First, states need the rule of law. The rule of law provides impartiality as well as 
consistency. The rule of law also builds trust with the population; it creates the conditions 
for protecting the population, providing legitimate security, and ensuring that 
communities are lawfully and fairly reabsorbing ex-combatants. The rule of law and its 
enforcement also protects ex-combatants from reprisals, further encouraging illegally 
armed individuals to end fighting and resume civilian life. In addition to codifying laws, 
successfully safeguarding the rule of law requires a professional police force to enforce 
the laws. As both Meierhenrich and Ghani et al. argue, consistency and commitment will 
lead the population to obey and follow the rules. Ultimately, the rule of law restores order 
among individuals and societies in a state.  
International organizations and the DRC government did attempt to establish rule 
of law as a means of stabilizing the state. Specifically, as will be described in Chapter III, 
international organizations established mobile courts in the DRC in order to promote the 
rule of law and justice. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 2011, in 
partnership with other organizations, provided logistics, administrative support, and 
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technical assistance to 15 mobile courts in the DRC that helped 330 cases to be heard and 
193 perpetrators to be sentenced for crimes of sexual violence. Among those prosecuted 
were military officers who were convicted of sexual abuses and crimes against 
humanity.44 The conviction of higher ranked officers in these mobile courts built 
confidence and trust within society and demonstrated that those who violated human 
rights during the conflict would face legal action regardless of their government position 
and status or military rank. However, a comprehensive legal program that included 
security sector reform (SSR) was not implemented and prevented state wide rule of law 
and its enforcement from becoming a reality.  
Second, in order to institute a successful DDR program, and especially an 
effective reintegration strategy, the government needs to create programs aimed at 
motivating society to engage in the economic sector. Economic opportunity is critical for 
transitioning ex-combatants back into society. Without jobs and the potential to earn a 
living, combatants have little incentive to lay down their weapons and resume normal life 
which makes one wonder whether these economic programs might need to proceed. The 
final establishment of rule of law are proceed in tandem with government effort. As will 
be described in Chapter III, the DRC government is still its infancy and unable to develop 
the economy to its full potential. In the interim, the international community and 
nongovernmental organizations have taken responsibility for conducting development 
programs to mitigate violence in the country.  
A particular challenge for job training and placements of ex-combatants is 
fairness. Security experts point to the risk of frustrated, skilled, unemployed ex-
combatants returning to violence and crime if they are not well integrated back into 
society.45 However, assisting ex-soldiers and neglecting recipient communities can lead 
to resentment about preferential treatment going to the very individuals that perpetrated 
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acts of violence against communities and the wider society. Hans Rouw and Rens 
Willems, for example, argue that providing skills and education to just one side can give 
the appearance that perpetrators are being rewarded for violent behavior, and can trigger 
retribution. Worse still, members of the younger generation might think that joining a 
militia is a strategy to get a job or job training when combatants receive assistance while 
noncombatants struggle on their own.46 In order to address this problem, it is important 
that economic development programs create incentives for both former soldiers to lay 
down their weapons and for the communities to which they return to welcome former 
fighters back. Properly structured, economic integration programs can achieve both 
goals.47 
Third, conflict-affected states need to develop good relationships with 
neighboring countries in order to deter cross-border skirmishes, promote the existence of 
safe havens, and block the flow of weapons, as well as to encourge the successful 
repatriation of foreign fighters back to their country of origin. Frequently, internal 
conflicts are exacerbated by the ability of illegally armed combatants to base, organize, 
and train in neighboring countries, and without a good relationship between countries, 
these activities cannot be curtailed. By contrast, bad relationships create an environment 
in which neighboring countries host militias or armed groups and support them by 
providing training for destabilizing the other state. Good diplomatic relations between the 
war-affected country and its neighbors will not only improve communication and assist 
with the repatriation of refugees, militias, and armed forces, but it will help reduce 
tensions in society. As will be described in Chapter III, foreign soldiers on Congolese soil 
have intensified insecurity and have had a negative impact on DDR programs in the 
country.  
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These three factors of reintegration—security and justice; economic opportunity; 
and good relations with neighboring countries—will be further explored in Chapter III, 
which looks specifically at DDR programs implemented in the DRC and why they did 
not succeed in creating lasting peace.  
D. MEASURING SUCCESS IN DDR PROGRAMS 
Measuring success in DDR programs requires understanding the short- and long-
term goals of these programs and identifying benchmarks that show progress towards 
these goals. Ultimately, the goal of DDR programs should be to create lasting peace 
within communities, societies, and post-conflict states. This lasting peace can be 
measured by stability, peace, and security within a state, which allows development and 
economic growth, and the country’s good relationships with its neighbors.  
Too often, measures of performance are confused with measures of success in 
DDR programs, producing false positives for progress towards lasting peace and stability. 
For example, Paul Omach argues that the UN views DDR as a symbolic and confidence-
building program, as opposed to a necessary step in peace building. In several cases, the 
UN has measured success by the number of weapons collected, as well as by how many 
ex-soldiers are demobilized. These short-term measures have allowed peace agreements 
to advance without interruption, but ultimately have not contributed to lasting peace.48  
Omach further stresses that actors conducting DDR programs need to integrate 
the formal and informal processes of returning ex-combatants to society to truly measure 
the success of the program. Informal demobilization for the ex-combatants often makes 
use of local rituals, cultures, norms, and beliefs with the goal of “cleansing” former 
fighters and returning them back to full membership in the community. For example, ex-
soldiers from Uganda and Mozambique performed rituals that helped society to take them 
back. Specifically, the Acholi people of northern Uganda performed cleansing rituals of 
stepping on eggs and jumping over branches of Olwedo shrubs as a means of spiritually 
cleansing the fighters. These rituals encouraged acceptance of combatants by the 
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population and helped facilitate psychological reintegration.49 Informal demobilization 
programs like these are integral to creating forgiveness and acceptance among members 
of communities and building lasting peace. However, such activities are rarely captured 
by standard tools for evaluating DDR programs. 
Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl and Nicholas Sambanis argue that the reduction of 
violence and crime in postwar societies is the measurable outcome that ultimately proves 
the success of DRR programs in recovering states. The reduction of violence should be 
measured by several factors, including the number of guns in circulation, the level of 
noncriminal economic activity, a decline in civilian violence (as opposed to just 
combatant violence), and the level of criminal activity seen in the community.50 Jonah 
Leff often gives the examples of Mozambique and Sierra Leone, where combatants 
ultimately turned in their weapons to DDR centers, communities accepted the fighters, 
and they were able to live together and resume normal life.51 
From this discussion, this thesis proposes the following long-term measures and 
indicators for the success of DDR programs. First, communities’ positive reception of ex-
combatants is a critical measure of success for DDR programs. Internal wars, including 
insurgency and civil war, often impact multiple communities within a state. This legacy 
of violence can affect ex-combatants’ relationships with local communities and 
reintegration. Therefore, a successful DDR program needs to consist of culturally 
acceptable ways of reintegrating ex-combatants back into communities that will result in 
acceptance and peace.  
Second, the acceptance of law and order by both ex-combatants and the general 
population is another long-term measure of success of an effective DDR program. As 
described in the previous section, the creation of law and effective police and judicial 
institutions to enforce the law is important for creating a viable state. Similarly, DDR 
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programs cannot succeed unless ex-combatants and the general population recognize the 
rule of law and accept it as the only legitimate source of justice. Benchmarks that show 
progress towards this long-term measure of success include a reduced level of reprisals 
between the population and ex-combatants, an increased number of civil cases involving 
ex-combatants being brought before courts; and reduced violence against government 
forces. As the UN expresses it, the task of DDR is to support a peace-building procedure, 
and to assist warring factions to plan, implement, and consolidate the setting for the 
achievement of a peace agreement, but the success of the program largely depends on the 
link between the security service and judicial system.52 The symbiotic relationship 
between the two facilitates the prosperity of the nation. 
Third, the presence and status of refugees is another important measure of success 
in a DDR program. The presence of refugees in neighboring states, particularly along the 
border, can be both a reflection of violent instability, and a cause of it. First, internal 
conflicts, such as insurgencies and civil wars, often create forced migration that result in 
refugees who cross borders, and internally displaced persons (IDP) who move but remain 
within a state’s borders. While tracking and measuring IDPs can be difficult because it 
requires monitoring activities inside a conflict state, tracking and counting refugees is 
often easier and receives attention from international bodies like the United Nations.  
The placement of refugee camps near borders of conflict-ridden states allows 
refugees to mass near their home country, potentially increasing the chances of their 
return after the conflict has subsided. However, these refugees can became a target for 
warring groups, particularly if the refugee camp holds opposing forces. Refugee camps 
can also provide a place for combatants to hide amongst the population, allowing them to 
rest, receive nourishment, and regroup. James Milner, for example, stresses that the 
establishment of refugee camps or settlements away from the border areas reduces 
tensions between neighboring states. In particular, creating camps some distance away 
from factions or ethnic groups engaged in the fighting may reduce the chance of attacks 
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being carried out from inside the country hosting the refugees.53 A UNDP report says, for 
example, that war leads to both combatants and civilians crossing borders; however, the 
security threat is high in the bordering states when fighters cross the border and are 
granted refugee status. It is important to identify, disarm, and separate combatants from 
the refugee population to deter attacks in refugee temporary shelters or prevent 
recruitment of youth and able-bodied males and females into rebel groups.54  
For instance, consider the presence of pro-Gbagbo fighters on Liberian soil. 
Armed attacks from Liberia into Ivory Coast caused the deaths of civilians and United 
Nations peacekeepers.55 Under these conditions, the population and groups that 
supported them retained their weapons for self-protection, which undermined the success 
of Ivory Coast’s DDR program. Christina Solomon and Jeremy Ginifer argue, therefore, 
that the reduction of cross-border combatants and small weapons trafficking from 
neighboring countries is another measure of success of DDR programs.56 In other words, 
the very movement of foreign combatants from a conflict state to a non-conflict state 
could destabilize communities living in the border areas. Solomon and Ginifer also 
explain that, though the DDR program in Sierra Leone officially closed in January 2002, 
the country is continuing to experience armed crime and violence on the border with 
Liberia, along with overall increases in insecurity and the risk of an influx of small arms 
into border communities.57 Overall, the persistence of violence in border areas 
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undermines DDR programs and increases the likelihood of fighting between border 
communities.  
Finally, the return of former soldiers to lawful employment, and the overall 
improvement of local economies, is an important measure of success in DDR programs. 
Solomon and Ginifer describe, for example, that the Sierra Leonean DDR program 
managed to train former soldiers and empower them with technical skills for automobile 
repair, metalwork, furniture work, and construction. After completing the training, trainees 
received tools, kits, and assistance in seeking jobs in public works and development 
projects.58 Employment opportunities reduced the level of violence and helped return the 
country to normal. Conversely, a lack of employment opportunities has hindered the 
success of DDR programs elsewhere. Lilli Banholzer, for example, argues that to disarm 
ex-combatants implies the end of their employment as fighters and loss of income. Failure 
to find job or income-generating activity will most likely lead ex-combatants to take up 
arms again, including joining rebel groups in other countries, as well as engaging in 
criminal activities or illicit trade. An example of this is the number of South African ex-
soldiers who became mercenaries in violent conflicts in Angola and the DRC.59 
However, as argued in the previous section, it is also important to create 
incentives for society as a whole, and not only to favor ex-combatants. No program, 
however, is possible without an overall improvement in a country’s economy. Therefore, 
the benchmarks for employment that this thesis will use include a country’s per capita 
gross domestic product (GDP), diversity of economy, poverty index, and international 
trade.  
In sum, this thesis will ask the following questions regarding measures of 
effectiveness (MOE) to analyze the DRC’s DDR program: 
1. Community reintegration 
a. Is there violence between the community and the ex-combatants?  
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b. Did the community create a ritual or cultural practice to 
reintroduce the ex-combatants to society?  
 
2. Acceptance of law and order 
a. What is the level of crime in the community? 
b. What are the levels of violent crime? 
 
3. Status of refugees 
a. What is the number of refugees in neighboring countries, 
particularly along the borders? 
b. What is the number of refugees being voluntarily repatriated?  
 
4. Economic prosperity 
a. What is the level of development in the country? What are the 
main legitimate economies? Are they growing? 
b. What is the per capita GDP? 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
The creation of a comprehensive and lasting DDR program requires not just 
disarming ex-combatants and returning them to their homes, but also rebuilding a state’s 
rule of law, delivering security that the population perceives as legitimate and fair, and 
creating economic opportunity and good relationships with neighboring countries. Good 
governance, in other words, is necessary for successful DDR programs and helps 
accelerate the building of trust and confidence among all parties and sectors of society. 
Furthermore, programs that allow ex-combatants and the population to work together in 
economic activities help stabilize society. By contrast, the absence or lack of 
collaboration may result in the ex-soldiers rearming and returning to combat for their 
survival. 
The next chapter uses the three variables of reintegration identified here—
security, law, and justice; economic opportunity; and good relations with neighboring 
countries, as well as their corresponding measures of effectiveness—to evaluate the DDR 
program initiated in the DRC from November 2004 to September 2009, to better 
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III. THE CONGOLESE WAR AND DDR PROGRAM 
A. BACKGROUND 
In July 1999, several warring factions in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
signed the Lusaka ceasefire agreement with the intention of ending the years-long 
Congolese wars.60 A key component of the peace accords was a DDR program that 
aimed to disarm and return legally and illegally armed fighters to civilian life. The DDR 
program also included an UN-led mission, the Mission de l’Organisation des Nations 
Unies au Congo, (MONUC) aimed to disarm and repatriate external forces from the 
DRC, including soldiers from Rwanda, Hutu militias, and Interehamwe, to their country 
of origin. Despite the official consensus on ending the war in the country, violence 
continued.61  
On December 17, 2002, key parties signed another accord, the Global and All-
Inclusive Agreement in Pretoria, South Africa, with the goal of restructuring and 
integrating the Congolese national army to strengthen stability and security in the 
country.62 The new Army Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo 
(FARDC) replaced the old Army Forces Armees Congolaises (FAC) with the overall aim 
of incorporating all combatants into the national army. A key component of this 
restructuring included the voluntary demobilization, retraining, and redeployment of 
legally and illegally armed individuals.63 Despite all of these efforts to establish peace in 
the DRC and use DDR programs to end violence, instability and war have persisted. 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the conditions that led to the first and 
second Congolese wars and to provide an overview of the DDR programs initiated to 
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create lasting peace in the country. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first 
section describes the conditions that led to the first and second Congolese wars. The 
second section briefly describes the main rebel groups, ethnic militias, and government 
forces fighting in the DRC. The third section outlines the three phases of the DDR 
program and describes the actors that contributed to and supervised the implementation 
of the program. And, the fourth section offers concluding thoughts.  
B. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF DRC CONFLICT 
The DRC gained independence on June 30, 1960, from Belgium.64 In November 
24, 1965, Joseph Mobutu overthrew the newly formed independent government through a 
military coup, took power as president, and led the central government and the army. 
Mobutu published a new constitution in March 1967 that stipulated a single chamber 
parliament, one political party, a judiciary, and provincial governors. National service, 
specifically military service, was compulsory under the new constitution.65 Mobutu 
further renamed the nation Zaire instead of Congo.66 Later on, Mobutu changed his name 
from Joseph-Desire Mobutu to Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu wa Za Banga (“The 
all-powerful warrior who goes from conquest to conquest, leaving fire in his wake”).67 
Over the course of his years in power, he successfully destroyed state institutions, which 
allowed him to stay in power and eliminate political opposition. Moreover, political 
interference and corruption eroded the justice system, government bureaucracy, and 
security services. In addition to undermining the state, Mobutu’s administration depended 
on Cold War allies and mercenaries to suppress military challenges. With the end of the 
Cold War, many of these resources dried up, presenting challenges to his leadership and 
to stability in the country.68  
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Alongside the destructive policies of the Mobutu regime, conflicts in neighboring 
countries greatly affected Congo’s stability. In 1994, the Rwanda genocide caused a mass 
exodus of refugees to the neighboring countries of Burundi, Zaire, Congo and Tanzania. 
UNHCR and nongovernmental organizations opened refugee camps just across Rwanda’s 
borders in neighboring countries to provide humanitarian assistance to the war victims. 
The focal locations for the camps in the Congo soil were Katale, Kahindo, Mugunga, Lac 
Vert, and Sake in Goma in North Kivu Province. The camps quickly became infiltrated 
with ex-FAR soldiers (Forces Armees Rwandaises - Hutu ethnic from Rwanda), and 
politicians, migrating under the protection of refugee status. These infiltrators compelled 
refugees to provide them with food rations and medical supplies. They rewarded those 
who complied and punished those who were loyal to humanitarian aid workers.69 
President Mobutu helped ex-FAR leaders by broadcasting anti-Tutsi messages and 
supplying weapons, particularly in Kivu.70 In October 1994, ex-FAR forces crossed into 
the DRC and killed 36 people near Gisenyi. The main targets were Tutsi, but some Hutu 
civilians were victimized as a means of intimidation and to compel their support.71 
In October 1995, war broke out in Kivu, forcing Congolese Tutsi, ex-FAR, and 
Interahamwe to flee to Rwanda. The following year, the Mobutu administration sent the 
Vangu Commission (a DRC parliament committee) to Kivu to identify members of the 
Zairian population and to declare all non-Zairians, including Tutsi and Banyamulenge, to 
be refugees. Between March and May 1996, the government launched a forced 
repatriation campaign against Tutsi refugees in Rutshuru and Masisi in North Kivu.72 
This ethnic repatriation program sparked animosity between the Rwandan and Mobutu 
governments. Ethnic Hutus used this opportunity to conduct offensive attacks and raids 
against ethnic Tutsi in the area, resulting in the escalation of conflict in the DRC. Burundi 
and Rwanda accused the Zairian government of supporting rebel groups to destabilize 
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their countries. Mobutu’s policy ultimately motivated Laurent Kabila, the leader of the 
exiled Congolese revolutionary party, to join forces with Banyamulenge-Rwandan 
Patriotic Army (RPA) rebels to overthrow Mobutu. Bad relations between these countries 
further generated hostilities in the Great Lakes region. 
According to Gerard Prunier, the first war in the DRC broke out in September 
1996. The Banyamulenge/RPA rebels with support from the Rwandan Army, in 
collaboration with a Congolese opposition movement under the leadership of Joseph 
Desire Kabila, attacked Zaire with the intention of overthrowing Mobutu and ending his 
support to various rebels groups and Hutu militia in the border areas. A joint Congolese 
rebel political movement was formed in North Kivu on October 18, 1996, under the name 
Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo-Zaire (AFDL). On 
November 15, refugees began crossing the border from Zaire to Rwanda to flee the 
war.73  
The RPA-Banyamulenge rebels (Congolese of Rwandan ancestry living in South 
Kivu—literally people from Mulenge) who had been in conflict with Mobutu’s 
government and supported by the Rwandan Patriotic Forces (RPF), started attacking the 
Hutu refugee camps in eastern DRC (then Zaire) in September 1, 1996, dispersing 
refugees in Bukavu and South Kivu.74 To protect the Congolese, the local Congolese 
authorities collaborated with Babembe and Barega armed groups to kill and loot in the 
Banyamulenge community.75 The RPF provided training and logistical support to these 
Banyamulenge forces to help them eliminate Hutu rebel bases in Kivu.76 Mobutu’s policy 
ultimately motivated Laurent Kabila, the leader of the exiled Congolese revolutionary 
party, to join forces with the Banyamuleng to overthrow Mobutu. Kabila, AFDL/RPA 
forces, and allies from Rwanda and Uganda successfully overthrew the Mobutu regime in 
May 1997; they changed the name of the country from Zaire to the Democratic Republic 
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of Congo and the name of the national army to the Forces Armees Congolaises (FAC).77 
This was the first Congolese war and it lasted from September 1996 until May 1997. 
The second Congolese war broke out on August 3, 1998, and involved rebel 
forces from Kivu province supported by Rwanda and Uganda fighting FAC backed by 
Angola, Namibia, Chad, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.78 In July 1998, just after a year in office, 
Kabila dismissed Colonel James Kabarebe, who had Rwandan origins but commanded 
the Congolese army, and expelled all Rwandan forces and ordered them to depart from 
the DRC.79 Kabila’s opponents from the east of the DRC created a new rebel group 
called Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD), with intention of removing 
him from power after the removal of Rwandans.80 
The eviction of Rwandans from the government, which in turn caused the mutiny 
of soldiers of Rwandan descent in the Kivu, Bukavu, Goma, Baraka, Kindu, Kisangani 
and Kinshasa regions of Congo, triggered further hostilities in the DRC. The second 
Congolese war started when the RPA, under the command of James Kabarebe, moved to 
the border to support anti–Kabila rebels in Kivu province. Commander Kabarebe landed 
at Kitona on August 4, via hijacked planes, to organize the rebellion in eastern DRC. 
Kabarebe and his forces killed several Congolese officers in Kavumu camp who were 
loyal to the Kabila administration.81 Following these events, war escalated in the eastern 
section of the country. The official war lasted one year, and then was followed by a series 
of peace accords, including DDR programs aimed at creating lasting peace, which is 
further described in Section D of this chapter.  
Scholars offer several hypotheses for the causes of the first and second Congolese 
wars. Rouw and Rens, for example, argue that North and South Kivu were the locations 
where the Congolese war truly started. According to them, land disputes between ethnic 
groups in these areas and the weakness of the government in solving these disputes, 
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particularly in the populated areas, were the major causes of the conflict.82 Specifically, 
Congolese Tutsi occupied more land than did indigenous Congolese, resulting in an 
ethnically based dispute that generated hatred towards the Congolese Tutsi, particularly 
in the eastern parts of the DRC.83 
Another cause of the Congolese wars was conflicts in neighboring countries. The 
influx of refugees, ex-FAR, and Interahamwe after the 1994 Rwanda genocide on the 
border with Rwanda and Uganda proved another source of increased ethnic conflict 
among the population.84 Severine Autesserre argues that refugees began to compete with 
Congolese citizens over land ownership in the border areas, which led to intensified 
disputes over land and resources, triggering violence between Congolese Hutu/Tutsi 
populations and Rwanda Hutu/Tutsi already in the DRC. The tensions between older 
populations of Rwandans in the DRC and newly arriving refugees further fueled the 
fighting. These clashes ultimately produced a complex network of armed groups and 
militias, each with the goal of defending Congolese land and resources from refugees and 
non-native Congolese.85  
Yet another argument for the cause of the wars in the DRC focuses on Mobutu’s 
relationship with Rwandan forces. Prunier, for example, stresses that, the immediate 
cause of the first war was the support Mobutu gave to Rwandan Hutu (ex- FAR and 
Interahamwe) against Congolese Tutsi (Banyamulege). In May 1996, the Mobutu regime 
supported ex-FAR leaders by buying weapons and providing camps for training and 
recruiting soldiers. Ultimately, these resources provided the opportunity for these forces 
to conduct a series of attacks and raids over the border against the RPF, with the goal of 
recapturing Rwanda.86 
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Regardless of the different hypotheses for the causes of the wars, both conflicts 
militarized large segments of the population, weakened DRC’s economy, and badly 
damaged its political and physical infrastructure. In order to better understand the 
conditions that have inhibited the end of conflict in DRC, and the failed DDR programs 
in particular, it is first necessary to summarize the main fighting groups in the country.  
C. MAJOR REBEL GROUPS, ETHNIC MILITIAS, AND GOVERNMENT 
FORCES 
Perhaps one of the greatest obstacles to lasting peace in the DRC is the sheer 
number of different fighting groups in the conflict. This section provides a brief overview 
of the different rebel groups, their leaders, and splinter groups; ethnic militias that have 
emerged primarily as defense forces; and different government forces fighting in the first 
and second Congolese wars.  
1. Rebel Groups 
The conflict in the DRC involved various Congolese rebel fighters and rebel 
fighters from neighboring countries that complicated the peace and caused the escalation 
of hostilities between communities in the country. This section discusses armed groups 
from the DRC and neighboring countries that operated and participated during the 
Congolese war. 
a. Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD)—DRC 
The RCD was a rebel group created on August 16, 1998, to topple President 
Kabila. RCD was supported by Burundi, Uganda, and Rwanda. Wamba dia Wamba was 
the president of the RDC, and Jean-Pierre Ondekane was its military leader.87 In May 
1999, the group split into two factions: RCD-G (RCD-Goma) with support from Rwanda; 
and RCD-K (RCD-Kisangani), which was backed by Uganda.88 In November 1999, 
RCD-G split and created a new faction named RCD-ML (RCD-Mouvement de 
Liberation) under the leadership of Wamba dia Wamba. In late November 1999, Roger 
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Lumbala a prominent leader of RCD-G formed his own group named RCD-N (RCD- 
National).89 On January 16, 2001, the RCD-ML, RCD/N, and Movement for the 
Liberation of Congo merged to form the Front de Liberation du Congo (FLC) and 
became a political party during the transition period.90  
b. Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC)—DRC 
The MLC was a group of rebel fighters founded by Jean-Pierre Bemba, the son of 
former President Mobutu. On November 7, 1998, following the overthrow of the Mobutu 
regime, the MLC officially became an armed rebel group backed by Uganda. The MLC-
UPDF (Uganda People’s Defense Force) has been active in Equateur province with the 
intention of capturing Kisangani.91  
In 2002 to 2003, Jeanne-Pierre Bemba, as the president of the MLC, collaborated 
with his militia group to commit crimes and violence against the civilians in the Central 
African Republic. Because of that allegation the International Criminal Court of justice 
issued an arrest warrant; in 2008 Bemba was arrested, convicted and put in jail. That led 
to leadership difficulties that caused the group to break away. Jose Makila Sumanda, the 
governor of Equateur, defected from the MLC and formed a new party known as the 
Labour Alliance for Development on May 5, 2011. In addition, former MLC secretary 
general Francois Muamba formed a new opposition party called the Alliance for 
Development and the Republic on July 11, 2011.92 
c. Nationalist Integrationist Front (FNI)—DRC 
The FNI was founded by Floribert Ndjabu Ngabu and Etienne Lona in Ituri, and 
is comprised primarily of the Lendu, an ethnic group. The FNI has fought the Hema tribe 
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in Ituri and was blamed for the killing of UN peacekeepers in the area. FNI has received 
support from Uganda.93 The FNI has prolonged the conflict in eastern DRC contrary to 
the peace agreement signed in April 2003, which involved all rebels, militias, and 
political parties. The March 2005 arrest of Etienne Lona, a key leader, caused the group’s 
disintegration. The FNI became a political party known as the National Congolese Party 
in August 2005, following former combatants’ participation in a DDR program in Ituri 
province (DCR). At that time, that group ended its relationship with Lendu combatants 
and ceased to be an armed group.94  
d. Union of Congolese Patriots (Union des Patriots Congolais, UPC)—
DRC 
The UPC operated in Ituri with the goal of protecting the interests of the Hema 
ethnic group. Rwanda sponsored that ethinc group to conduct violence and criminal 
activities against civilians. In 2003, the group fragmented to form UPC–K, under the 
leadership of Kisembo Bahemuka, and the Union of Congolese Patriots, headed by 
Thomas Lubanga and Commander Bosco Taganda, who have been accused of human 
rights abuses.95 In 2005, UPC leader Thomas Lubanga was arrested on charges of 
sending and recruiting children under the age of 15 to the battlefield. On July 10, 2012, 
he was sentenced to 14 years in prison.96 The arrest of group members in April 2005 
triggered his followers to end the atrocities and stop fighting.97  
e. Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)—Uganda 
The LRA was formed in the mid-1980s by the opponents of the Ugandan 
government. Joseph Kony is the leader of the group. From the 1980s to early 2000s, the 
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rebel group operated in northern Uganda and southern Sudan. The group received 
assistance from Sudan such as military equipment and supplies to wage war. In 2005, the 
LRA moved to the DRC and the Central African Republic (CAR) after South Sudan 
gained its independence.98 That rebel group was responsible for kidnapping, torturing, 
committing massacres, engaging in the sex-slave trade, and enslaving children as 
soldiers, which is contrary to human rights law. It is still active and is mostly thought to 
be located in the CAR. In March 2016, the Security Council committee listed the LRA as 
“engaging in or providing support for acts that undermine the peace, stability or security 
of the CAR.”99  
f. Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)—Uganda 
This religious-based group originated from the Ruwenzori mountain area of 
western Uganda and operates in Uganda and eastern DRC with the aim of establishing 
Sharia law in their country of origin. Jamil Mukulu created that group in the late 1990s. 
The rebel group was involved in criminal activities such as killings, beheadings, rapes, 
kidnappings, and enslavement of children as soldiers in Uganda and the DRC.100 
According to a Global Security think tank report, the ADF is still active and responsible 
for numerous attacks on civilians in the DRC. On August 13, 2016, the ADF attacked 
civilians in the Beni region and killed 50 people.101 The major armed groups fighting 
during the second Congolese war are summarized in Table 1. 
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Table 1.   Summary of major armed groups 
Group Leader Aligned 
Country 
Objective 
RCD Wamba dia 
Wamba 
Rwanda Remove President Laurent Kabila 
RDC–N Roger Lumbala Uganda Remove President Laurent Kabila  
MLC Jean-Pierre Bemba Uganda Remove President Laurent Kabila 
RCD-K Mbusa Nyamisi Rwanda Remove President Laurent Kabila 
FNI Floribert Ndjabu 
Ngabu & Etienne 
Lona 




Uganda Protect the interest of Hema ethnic 
group 
LRA Joseph Kony DRC Remove President Museveni and 
establish state based on Kony’s 
interpretation of the Bible’s Ten 
Commandments 
ADF Jamil Mukulu DRC Establish Sharia law in Uganda 
 
2. Ethnic Militias in Ituri  
In addition to the groups mentioned earlier in this section, the DRC also has 
ethnic and tribal groups that have participated in the conflict in the form of militias or 
other loosely organized groups, specifically the Mayi Mayi, Interahamwe, Burundi 
rebels, and ethnic militia groups in Ituri and the Kivu, and Banyamulenge.  
a. Mayi Militias—DRC 
Mayi–Mayi or Mai-Mais are self-defense militia groups found in the eastern part 
of the DRC; they were formed to protect their communities from rebel groups and 
government forces. During the war, these militias stayed loyal to the Congolese 
government and supported the government in its fight against the Rwandan army.102  
b. Ex-FAR and Interahamwe  
After the Rwanda massacre in 1994, Hutus fled to the DRC and became another 
source of support for the DRC government forces during the war. These forces had a 
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falling out with the Kabila administration. However, during the second Congolese war, 
they came back from Brazzaville, Gabon, and Sudan to support the Kabila regime when it 
was under Rwandan attack.103  
c. Banyamulenge (Congolese Tutsi of Rwandan Descent) 
Tutsi lived in the DRC prior to colonialism; however, greater numbers migrated 
there in the early 1920s as laborers on the plantations, followed by additional waves in 
the 1960s and 1970s as Tutsis fled massacres by the new Hutu government in Rwanda. 
As described in Section B, Congolese tribes accused the Tutsis of taking their land, 
fueling animosity and resentment in the regions in which they settled, and ultimately 
spurring the large-scale massacre of those perceived to be Rwandan Tutsis in North and 
South Kivu.104 During the second Congolese war, Banyamulenge residents of the DRC 
collaborated with Rwandan and Ugandan forces to remove Kabila from power.  
d. The Forces for Defense of Democracy (FDD)—Burundi 
Ethnic Tutsis dominate the Pierre Buyoya regime in Burundi, fueling animosity 
among ethnic Burundians, most of whom are Hutus. This dynamic led to Burundian 
Hutus joining forces with ethnic Hutus from the DRC to fight the Tutsi-dominated 
government in Burundi, eventually creating the FDD, which is located near the 
Burundian border in eastern Congo.105 The presence of the FDD and the instability it has 
caused has prompted Burundian government forces to go on the offensive in the DRC 
with the goal of eliminating Burundi rebel bases and protecting its borders.106 Table 2 
summarizes the ethnic groups involved in the second Congo War. 
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Table 2.   Summary of major ethnic groups in the DRC war 
Ethnic Group Aligned Country Objective 
Mayi–Mayi militias DRC Protect ancestral land and 
resources 
Ex-FAR and Interahamwe 
(Hutu armed forces) 
DRC Eliminate Congolese Tutsi and 
remove President Paul Kagame  
Banyamulenge (Congolese 
Tutsi) 
Rwanda Eliminate Congolese Hutu and 
remove President Laurent Kabila  
FDD (Burundians Hutu) Anti-Burundi Remove the Tutsi government in 
Burundi 
 
3. Government Security Forces 
In addition to insurgent groups and ethnic militias, several countries’ government 
forces were also active in the DRC: specifically, the Rwandan Patriotic Army, Uganda 
Peoples’ Defense Forces, and the Burundi army. Each of these armies had different 
motives and goals for engaging in the Congolese conflict. The main goal for Rwanda and 
Uganda was to overthrow the Kabila regime. Burundi’s main objective was to eliminate 
bases of Hutu rebels.  
During the second Congolese war, Kabila’s army, the FAC, was too weak to 
launch offensive actions and unable to successfully compel Burundian, Rwandan, and 
Ugandan forces to withdraw. This dynamic prompted forces from Angola, Zimbabwe, 
Namibia, Sudan, and Chad to enter the war to support Kabila to retain his power.107 The 
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Table 3.   Summary of the major government forces 
Country  Leader Forces Objective 
Angola President Jose 
Eduardo dos Santos 
Angolan Army Assist President Laurent 
Kabila to remain in power 
Burundi President Pierre 
Buyoya 
Burundi Forces Destroy Hutu base in DRC 
DRC President Joseph 
Kabila 
FAC Hold power  




Assist President Laurent 
Kabila to remain in power 
Rwanda President Paul 
Kagame 
RPF Remove President Laurent 
Kabila from office 
Uganda President Yoweri 
Museveni 
UPDF Remove President Laurent 
Kabila from office 
Zimbabwe President Robert 
Mugabe 
ZNA Assist President Laurent 
Kabila to remain in power 
  
As will be discussed next, the rebel groups, militias, and government forces all 
required some form of DDR program to reduce violence and end the conflict in DRC. 
However, the sheer number of factions engaged in the fighting and individuals 
militarized as a result of these wars presented considerable challenges for the DRC 
government, neighboring countries, and the international community as many sought to 
effectively demobilize or transition these factions and militias into lawfully armed forces.  
D. PEACE ACCORDS AND DDR PROGRAMS IN THE DRC 
The DRC, neighboring countries, and some rebel groups signed a series of peace 
accords aimed at ending the second war in Congo. The first of these, the Lusaka ceasefire 
agreement signed in July 1999, involved leaders from Angola, the DRC, Namibia, 
Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, as well as the MLC and RCD rebel groups in August 
1999.108 The agreement, which was validated through UN resolution 1927, sketched the 
peace process by stipulating the deployment of the MONUC peacekeepers and the 
removal of all external forces in the DRC.109 The agreement also laid the initial 
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framework for a national DDR program, including political dialogue amid the 
government of DRC and rebel fighters to settle their differences through peaceful 
means.110 Before the achievement of a final peace deal, however, President Laurent 
Kabila was killed, paving the way for Kabila’s son, Joseph Kabila, to become the head of 
state.111 Hostilities continued in the eastern part of the country despite the pull out of 
external forces.112  
In July 2002, a second round of peace talks was held in Pretoria, South Africa, 
which involved the DRC government and Rwanda. This peace accord convened the 
Congolese army to track down, disarm, dismantle, and repatriate ex-FAR and 
Interahamwe. The peace accord also required the Rwandan People’s Army to withdraw 
from DRC.113 To reinforce the pull-out of Rwandan forces, the Congolese government 
called for the political leader of the Forces Democratiques des Liberation du Rwanda 
(FDLR) to leave the country on September 24, 2002.114 Meanwhile, the DRC and 
Uganda signed a separate peace agreement on Sept 6, 2002, in Luanda, Angola, which 
called for the withdrawal of the Ugandan military from the soil of the DRC.115 Despite 
both of these accords, the Congolese government accepted the prolonged presence of a 
UPDF battalion in the border region of Bunia and on the slopes of Mount Rwenzori to 
help dismantle the ADF.116  
Yet another set of accords, the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement Peace 
Accords, involving the DRC regime, rebel fighters, militias groups, and opposition 
parties, was signed on December 12, 2002. The signatories included President Joseph 
Kabila as the leader of the FAC, and the leaders of the RCD, RCD-K/ML, RCD-N, MLC, 
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Mayi-Mayis, active forces, and political opposition. These groups’ participation in the 
talks and agreement to the accords qualified them to participate in a DDR program, 
which will be described in more detail.117 These accords, signed in Pretoria, adjudicated 
the creation of a temporary government with four vice presidents and Joseph Kabila as 
the President; the new leaders were sworn into office in July of 2003.118  
Prior to the setting of the new transitional government, the “Final Act,” was 
signed in Sun City on April 2, 2003; this agreement created the framework to restructure 
and reintegrate various rebel fighters, militias, and government forces into the Congolese 
countrywide military force (FARDC).119 This accord aimed to bring the various fighting 
factions in the DRC under government control and also sought to better unify the 
different regions of the country. The escalation of hostilities in Ituri, however, prompted 
the need for another round of peace talks in May 2003, held in Dar es Salaam and in 
Kinshasa in May 2004.120  
Finally, on September 22, 2004, the governments of Rwanda and the Congo 
signed an agreement called the Joint Verification Mechanism aimed to address matters on 
illegal migration and to prevent the relapse of threats from ex-FAR and Interahamwe 
groups responsible for the Rwandan massacres.121  
A key component of several of these peace accords was the creation of DDR 
programs designed to end armed conflict in the DRC. The first DDR program, created 
during the 1999 Lusaka agreement, was headed by the DRC forces in collaboration with 
MONUC and had the principal aim of repatriating foreign fighters. The DDR program 
had two distinct goals: one was to target foreign troops, the ex-FAR, Interahamwe, and 
FDLR, and the other was to promote the repatriation of those fighters to their country.122 
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The overall objective of the DDR(RR) (disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, 
reintegration, and resettlement) program was to ensure that foreign troops were unable to 
interrupt the election process or pose a military threat to the DRC.123  
Mark Malan and Henri Boshoff outline that the program set 90 days as the 
timeframe—from July 30, 2002 to October 30, 2002—for the capturing, disarming, 
dismantling, and repatriating of ex-FAR and Interahamwe, and the pulling out of the 
Rwandan Patriotic Army.124 Zoe Marriage claims that Rwanda withdrew 23,400 troops 
during this timeframe; however, the DRC administration demanded that 20,000 troops 
from Rwanda remain under the umbrella of demobilization and community reinsertion in 
Kivu. On February 21, 2003, a UN report claimed the FDLR were not demobilized at 
all.125 Furthermore, a key objective in this initial program was to disarm foreign fighters, 
in addition to repatriating them. The same 2003 UN report claimed that the program only 
disarmed 402 Rwandan Hutus, leaving thousands of other fighters still armed.126  
The failure of this DDR(RR) program to remove foreign fighters from the DRC 
prompted the Congolese government to initiate a new accord for the demobilization of 
foreign troops in October 2004. Marriage reports that the ex-FAR and Interahamwe 
refused to comply with the agreement until March 31, 2005, and the FDLR would not 
comply with the agreement at all. Under these circumstances, the government attempted 
to forcibly disarm and repatriate the FDLR in 2005, but without success.127 
The Congolese government initiated a second major DDR effort in the DRC in 
2004. The government created the National Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration program (PNDDR), which was run by the Commission Nationale de la 
Demobilization et Reinsertion (CONADER) in December 2003. The PNDDR aimed to 
reestablish security in the country, to initiate security sector reform, and to unite the 
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army. Marriage claims the World Bank’s International Development Association released 
money in April 2004 to run the program and it was subsequently funded by the Multi-
donor Reintegration Program in the Great Lakes in May 2004. Other funds came from 
individual countries, such as Belgium, Canada, Germany, Norway, and the UK, as the 
financial assistance.128 The funds provided USD 200 million to demobilize former 
soldiers and USD 14 million to reform the military.129  
The first phase of the national DDR program lasted from October 2004 to 
December 2006, and provided two options for the ex-combatants, either to be integrated 
into the Forces Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo (FARDC), DRC’s new 
state military, or to demobilize and re-integrate into society. Those who decided to join 
security forces moved to brassage camps, that integration was run by CONADER in 
association with several DRC government agencies, including the Structure for Military 
Integration, the Interministerial Committee for DDR, and the Financial Management 
Unit. The Congolese government was responsible for security and moral support, while 
MONUC was in charge of the storage and destruction of weapons.130  
Boshoff notes that “according to the second draft of national DDR plan dated 
March 5, 2004, there [were] up to 330,000 combatants in the DRC, of whom 130,000 
need[ed] to be mobilized. The plan aim[ed] to limit the future combined DRC defense 
forces (FARDC) to no more than 130,000 people.”131 According to the National Plan, an 
adult combatant reporting for a CONADER DDR program received an instant “safety 
net” imbursement of USD 110, an official demobilization card, and USD 25 per month 
for 12 months. The program offered vocational training, schooling, and agricultural 
activities with the intention of providing adult combatants with useful skills.132  
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As these DDR efforts were under way, a new security challenge emerged. In 
February 2006, two armed brigades of RCD, the 81th, and the 83rd, refused to integrate 
into the national army.133 In July 2006, Laurent Nkunda, the ex-RCD leader, created a 
new political and military group named the National Congress for the Defense of the 
People, which included his RCD brigade and other ex-combatants.134 This rebel group 
allied itself with Rwanda under the pretext of protecting the Congolese Tutsi population. 
This development, in turn, led to other militia groups, such as the Mai-Mai Kifuafua, 
Coalition of Congolese Patriotic Resistance, and related Mayi- Mayi groups to reemerge 
to counter the National Congress for the Defense of the People.135  
Within CONADER, the government launched a second program, called the 
Disarmament and Community Reintegration program (DCR), which was based in Ituri 
province. The DCR program began on September 1, 2004, as a Rapid Response 
mechanism and ended in June 2005.136 This program was for ex-combatants from armed 
groups who were not the signatories of the Global and All-Inclusive Peace agreement, 
which initially disqualified them from the first phase of the DDR program run by the 
PNDDR. Seven militia groups: the Revolutionary Front for Ituri, the Popular Front for 
Democracy in Congo, the Party for Unity and Safeguarding the Integrity of Congo, the 
Union of Congolese Patriots, the Union of Congolese Patriots, the Popular Armed Forces 
for the Congo, and the FNI were eligible to participate in this DDR program.137  
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Under the DCR program, the government offered the ex-combatants two options: 
they could join the national army, or return to civilian life. The UNDP operated the 
community rehabilitation portion of the program, and reintegration camps were 
responsible for returning ex-combatants to civilian life. The program started by providing 
a three-day-long course in how to return to civilian life, followed by a USD 50 allowance 
for the ex-soldier and one month’s food supply for his family.138 National authorities 
such as CONADER, as well as FARDC, MONUC, the Integrated Military Structure, 
supported by international organizations including the United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF) and UNDP reinforced this program,139 which succeeded in demobilizing 
15,811 individuals. However, only 20 percent of their weapons were collected. Moreover, 
of the 6,200 weapons secured, 70 percent were old and unusable, suggesting that ex-
combatants did not truly disarm.140 In Ituri, several agencies disputed the figures given 
on numbers of disarmed militia members. For example, the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) claimed 12,500 former soldiers surrendered their weapons, while 
IRIN News put the figure at only 9,000 combatants.141 Ultimately, the exact numbers of 
ex-combatants who returned to civilian life and the number disarmed or the number of 
weapons collected remains unknown.  
Despite these initiatives aimed at demobilizing and disarming combatants, a 
February 2006 UNDP report revealed a high level of insecurity and fear across society, 
generated primarily by weak security sector institutions. Police and FARDC, in 
particular, were named as the sources of insecurity, harassing civilians, demanding 
bribes, extorting illegal taxes, and abusing human rights.142 The report suggests that lack 
of proper training, low salaries, or slow payment of salaries led security forces to engage 
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in illegal activities rather than protect the population.143 Furthermore, the deterioration of 
security prompted many ex-soldiers to take up weapons again to defend themselves and 
engage in criminal activities to survive. Increased insecurity also encouraged 
communities to form communal militia groups for protection.144 All of these 
developments undermined the DDR programs. 
Between 2004 and 2006, an estimated 102,014 individuals were demobilized, 
including 99,854 men and 2,160 women, of whom 83,986 individuals were integrated 
into the FARDC, including 1,560 women and 82,426 men. The program also disarmed 
186,000 combatants, including 182,280 men and 3,720 women.145 Despite these 
impressive figures, the exact number of individuals succesfully and permanently 
reintegrated into civilian life was not documented, nor was the total number of weapons 
collected or number of individuals who were disarmed. Nevertheless, in June 2006, 
CONADER closed 18 Orientation Centers due to a lack of funds and the DDR program 
ceased.146 
CONADER was replaced on July 14, 2007, by a newly formed governmental 
agency named l’Unité d’Execution du Programme National de Desarmement, 
Demobilisation et Reinsertion.147 This new agency marked the beginning of the second 
phase of the DDR program, which ran from July 2008 until December 2009. However, 
unrest in the eastern part of the country, particularly in North and South Kivu, delayed 
the program from opening for one year. The budget was USD 75 million, and the major 
donor was the World Bank while UNDP and PNDDR managed the program.148  
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Under this program, the ex-combatants had two options: demobilize and join 
FARDC, or integrate into civilian life. Combatants who decided to become soldiers were 
reallocated to the detention center and integrated to military forces. Over its six-month 
tenure, the program engaged in a continuous process of disarming, demobilizing, and 
reintegrating the signatories of the Global and All-Inclusive Agreements of December 17, 
2002. During the program’s six months of operation, from June to December 2009, an 
estimated 12,820 individuals were disarmed, of whom 4,782 were demobilized and 8,038 
integrated into the FARDC.149 The exact number of individuals returned to civilian life 
and the number of weapons collected remain undocumented. 
The limited success of this DDR effort led to the UN Security and Stabilization 
Support Strategy and the Congolese Programme de Stabilisation et de Reconstruction des 
Zones Sortant des Conflicts Armes (SRAREC) taking over this program. Under the 
SRAREC the DDR program succeeded in demobilizing an additional 2,000 combatants 
in 2010.150 The DDR programs are summarized in Table 4. 
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Table 4.   Summary of the DDR programs in DRC151 
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E. THE DRC TODAY  
Today, the DRC remains fragile and conflict-ridden, with limited security and 
weak government institutions. In 2009, the Stabilization and Recovery Funding Facility 
for the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo was established with the aim of 
addressing government weaknesses in providing services to the population. Since 2009, it 
has contributed almost 60 percent of the operating funds to support the DRC. 
Furthermore, the government of the DRC depends on financial management from UNDP 
for how to utilize multi-donor funds in collaboration with the Office of the Prime 
Minister.152 Despite these efforts, the country’s economy remains weak, resulting in its 
reliance on international donors and agencies as its main source of revenue for running 
the goverment. However, money from donors does not cover the DRC’s budget for 
government expenditures. 
In addition to a lack of infrastructure and services, DRC continues to struggle 
with providing basic security across the country. According to a January 2013 UNDP 
report, the government of the DRC only weakly controls the western parts of the country 
while the eastern part remains ungoverned. Roads and other critical infrastructure remain 
poor, further hindering both security and the economy. Ultimately, the government has 
never addressed the key factors and fundamentals that led to the outbreak of warfare.153 
In addition, the weakness of formal government institutions has undermined attempts to 
prevent violence and protect populations. The persistence of militias and rebels groups is 
evidence of the failure of the government to protect the country and its citizens. 
Despite all of these efforts aimed at reform, Rouw and Willems contend that the 
security structure in the DRC is still weak. Some security forces exist, but mainly in 
urban areas, while the countryside depends on local leaders such as the village chiefs for 
solving social and security problems. Problems, however, frequently arise when not all 
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accept the decisions of local leadership. The absence of FARDC and police in rural 
communities widens the insecurity gap.154  
Autesserre stresses that the absence of state authority in the eastern province, 
especially in the rural areas, has created an environment conducive for citizens to join 
militias and armed groups for self-protection.155 Furthermore, Autesserre notes that local 
government structures are corrupt, further hindering trust and cooperation by the 
population.156 These factors have contributed to members of the community arming 
themselves for protection against criminal gangs and security forces. In other words, 
weak governance and lawlessness in the eastern Congo have created fertile conditions for 
the emergence of militia groups that threaten the security of the local population. 
To date, the DRC continues to experience high rates of violence but much lower 
than at the height of the Congo war, massacres, and violations of human rights despite the 
presence of UN peacekeepers. According to a 2014 UN report on the DRC, 11,769 cases 
related to rape and violence toward women that occurred in Katanga, Maniema, 
Orientale, and South Kivu and North Kivu can be attributed to armed individuals.157 In 
eastern DRC, the ADF, FDLR, and other Mayi–Mayi groups continue to attack villages, 
massacre civilians, perpetrate abuses, and commit human rights violations. In 2014, the 
ADF attacked 35 villages and allegedly killed more than 650 people.158  
According to one human rights report, between 2012 and 2014, Congolese armed 
forces as well as non-state armed groups were responsible for killing civilians, 
kidnappings, burning homes, committing mass rapes, and forcibly recruiting children as 
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soldiers in eastern Congo. By using schools for military combat operations, the armed 
forces prevented children from attending school for fear of being captured and forced to 
join them. The ADF, M23, FDLR, APCLS, Mai-Mai Kifuafua, Nduma Defense of 
Congo, Nyatura, Raia Mutomoki, and Congolese armed forces were all implicated in 
actions like these.159  
The perseverance of militias and illegally armed forces demonstrates the 
weakness of the government in providing security to its citizens, and points to the overall 
failure of the DDR programs. Persistence of violence and the presence of different armed 
groups have only exacerbated insecurity and confused the population as to who the public 
should rely on for their protection. Lack of security has forced people to flee from the 
fighting to save their lives, thus reducing their engagement in economic activities. In 
many cases, economic hardship has compelled former soldiers to return to their original 
job as fighters. Former soldiers have also resorted to selling weapons or joining criminal 
groups to earn money.160 
Not surprisingly, the DRC’s overall economic situation remains weak. Despite 
DRC being one of the world’s most mineral rich countries, it has one of the world’s 
highest rates of poverty. Yet, economic growth has been improving and the poverty rate 
fell from 71 percent in 2005 to 63 percent in 2012, according to the World Bank.161 
However, DRC’s persistently high poverty rate reflects the country’s high rate of 
unemployment, with the majority of the population relying on informal employment 
activities and agriculture for survival. In particular, insecurity in eastern parts of the DRC 
prevents people there from being able to participate in economic activities. According to 
the World Bank Report of 2014, the DRC was ranked 176 out of 187 countries in 
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economic development with per capita income of USD 380, which is the lowest in the 
world.162  
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter began by outlining the causes of the first and second Congolese wars 
and describing the different rebel groups, government forces including of other countries, 
and ethnic militias that drove the outcome of these conflicts. The 1999 Lusaka peace 
agreement paved the way for the numerous peace accords to end the war in the DRC, 
prompting the DDR(RR) and DRR programs aimed at promoting long-term peace and 
security in the DRC and Great Lakes region. But despite these efforts to establish peace 
in the DRC, insecurity and violence have persisted in the eastern part of the country, 
particularly in South and North Kivu.  
The next chapter analyzes the DDR programs in the DRC, using the criteria and 
framework created in Chapter II, with the aim of better understanding the conditions that 
led to the failure of the DDR programs in establishing peace and stability in the DRC. 
The next chapter also provides conclusions and recommendations for the success of 










                                                 




















IV. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. ANALYSIS OF DDR PROGRAMS IN THE DRC 
The decades-long wars in the DRC have created regional instability, as well as 
political and social turmoil within the Congo; destroyed the country’s economy; and cost 
countless civilian lives. Chapter III described the conditions that led up to the wars in 
Congo, the different government forces that participated in the conflict, the rebel groups 
and defense militias that were formed in these wars, and the various DDR programs 
initiated as part of several peace accords designed to help end the conflict. Ultimately, 
domestic and international efforts aimed at repatriating foreign troops and demobilizing 
the thousands of armed individuals failed, and conflict has persisted in the DRC, 
including rapes, abductions, looting, and other violent crimes.  
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the efforts of the four DDR programs 
initiated to sustain peace and security in the DRC after the 2002 Pretoria Peace 
Agreement, and to understand better what succeeded and failed during the 
implementation of these programs. The chapter begins by providing a summary of short-
term efforts to demobilize, disarm, and repatriate various forces, noting key obstacles to 
success. The chapter then provides an in-depth analysis of reintegration efforts and goals 
of the DDR programs using the framework created in Chapter II–security, law and 
justice; economic opportunity; and good relations with the neighboring countries as well 
as their corresponding measures of effectiveness—to better understand what led to the 
failure of the DDR programs. 
Ultimately, this analysis finds that an unrealistically short timeline, insufficient 
funds, an overemphasis on disarmament, and the failure to include all key warring parties 
in the DDR process created major obstacles to success in short-term efforts to demobilize 
armed individuals and groups in the DRC. Long-term reintegration efforts have been 
hindered by poor linkages between DDR and security sector reform and the continued 
need for community-based security to fill the gap provided by insufficient and poorly 
trained government forces; the lack of government institutions or capacity to implement 
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and oversee reintegration programs; a chronically weak economic sector and lack of jobs; 
and continued tension with the DRC’s neighbors, particularly Rwanda. Given these 
findings, the timeframe for DDR(RR) in DRC should be a minimum of 15 years to allow 
enough time to conduct a comprehensive program that includes security sector reform, 
jobs programs, community-based activism, and a focus on the economy.  
B. ANALYSIS OF DEMOBILIZATION, DISARMAMENT, AND 
REPATRIATION EFFORTS 
Chapter III described initial efforts aimed at demobilizing, disarming, and 
repatriating foreign forces as part of the 2002 Pretoria Accords. The accords set the 
following goals for these efforts: task the Congolese army to find, disarm, dismantle and 
repatriate ex-FAR and Interahamwe, which created the FDLR; and remove the RPF from 
DRC.163 Ultimately, the program only succeeded in disarming 402 individuals and there 
was a disagreement on the number of repatriated troops; specifically, Rwanda claimed it 
withdrew 23,400 troops during the timeframe.164 However, the DRC claimed that 20,000 
Rwandan soldiers remained under the umbrella of the RCD in Kivu. A 2003 UN report 
claimed the FDLR had not been demobilized at all.165 
Yet another set of accords, the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement Peace 
Accords, were signed between the DRC government, rebels, and militia groups on 
December 17, 2002. The accords outlined the formation of a temporary regime, headed 
by Joseph Kabila and four vice presidents, who were sworn into office in July of 2003.166 
The Congolese government also launched a nationwide DDR program. The first phase 
ran from October 2004 to December 2006, and the second phase started in July 2008 and 
was completed in December 2009. Alongside this nationwide program, a separate DDR 
program was created specifically in Ituri province from September 1, 2004, to June 2005. 
Ultimately, the first phase of the nationwide DDR program succeeded in demobilizing 
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102,014 individuals, disarming 186,000 individuals, and integrating 83, 986 individuals 
into the national army. The second phase of the DDR program succeeded in demobilizing 
4,782 individuals, disarming 12,820 individuals, and integrating 8,038 individuals into 
the national army.167 The Ituri program succeeded in demobilizing 15,811 individuals 
and collecting 6,200 weapons, of which 70 percent were old and unusable.168 Several 
agencies disputed the figures on disarmed militias in Ituri. USAID, for example, claimed 
12,500 combatants were disarmed, while IRIN News put the figure at only 9,000 
combatants.169  
Although the exact number of those repatriated, demobilized, and disarmed 
remains debated, hundreds of thousands participated in these DDR programs, making 
these programs some of the largest in the region, if not the world. However, from 2002 to 
2009, despite a large number of participants, violence and insecurity have persisted in the 
DRC, but much lower than period of war. Four factors, in particular, contributed 
significantly to the shortcomings of these DDR programs: an unrealistically short 
timeline, insufficient funds, an overemphasis on disarmament, and the failure to include 
all key warring parties in the DDR process. These problems, which will be described in 
greater detail in the following section, created major obstacles to the success of short-
term efforts to demobilize armed individuals and groups in the DRC. 
1. Timeline 
All of the DDR programs initiated in the DRC suffered from unrealistically short 
timelines. First, the Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement, and 
Reintegration program that targeted external fighters such as Rwandan troops (RPA), 
former Forces Armees Rwandaises (ex-FAR), FDLR, and Interahamwe forces set only 90 
days as the timeframe for the pull-out of Rwandan armed forces, and the dismantlement 
of ex-FAR and Interahamwe.170 As described earlier, although tens of thousands of 
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individuals were repatriated, the program failed to remove all foreign troops, and an 
estimated 20,000 Rwandan units, in particular, remained in Kivu. Furthermore, the 
number of individuals disarmed was so small—only 402—that it most likely had no 
effect on the security environment.171 Following this initial attempt and its shortcomings, 
the Congolese government initiated new accords for the demobilization of foreign troops 
in October 2004. However, the ex-FAR and Interahamwe refused to sign the agreement 
until March 31, 2005, while the FDLR refused to comply with the agreement at all, 
compelling the FARDC to attempt to forcibly disarm these units, without success.172  
Ultimately, this phase of the DDR process was too short to implement the 
Demobilize, Disarm, and Repatriate stages of the process, and dismantle the ex-FAR, 
Interahamwe, and the FDLR. The timeline, measured in days and months, had little 
impact on solving major issues, and instead increased pressure to achieve quick results 
and prevented overseers from tackling the most difficult problems associated with 
removing and repatriating forces from DRC. Specifically, at the time of the DDR(RR) 
program, the FDRL had lived on Congo’s soil for two decades, allowing these forces to 
become established in the country, gain familiarity with the terrain, and build networks 
among the population. Altogether, the rebel fighters remained scattered in South and 
North Kivu, and the Virunga forest, making it difficult to track, identify, and ensure that 
all forces had been removed from the DRC.  
Furthermore, the short timeline did not allow sufficient time to create and 
consolidate government troops that could oversee the process. Repatriating foreign troops 
required credible, professional, well-equipped, and trained military forces to conduct the 
operation. However, at the time of the DDR(RR) program, the FARDC was a fusion of 
various rebel groups and government forces that lacked basic military training and 
discipline. These forces were compelled to undertake this job without competent 
knowledge or skills, and the short timeframe prevented effective consolidation or training 
of these forces. These forces also lacked major equipment and the intelligence necessary 
for conducting the mission. The difficulty of this task was compounded due to the fact the 
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ex-FAR and Interahamwe established strong social ties and networks with the Congolese 
population.  
Moreover, the DRC government did not have sufficient infrastructure to 
demobilize, disarm, and repatriate these forces, and the short timeframe did not allow 
enough time to build these resources. Under these conditions, it became difficult if not 
impossible to account for forces demobilized, or ensure that they had been repatriated. A 
lack of infrastructure was most likely one of the reasons why it was so difficult to account 
for an actual number of troops demobilized and repatriated at the end of the program.  
The short timeline also did not allow sufficient time for UN forces to deploy and 
help implement the repatriation process. The UN has no standing army or police force of 
its own; it depends on the contribution of forces from member states and it takes time to 
assemble and train these forces before they can deploy. The rapid and short timeframe 
assigned to the implementation of the repatriation process did not allow sufficient time 
for these forces to assemble and deploy. Ultimately, in 2002, the MONUC deployed only 
8,700 troops in the DRC, not nearly a sufficient number for overseeing such a large DDR 
program or for providing general security to the areas where the DDR process was 
occurring.  
Finally, the short timeframe for repatriating foreign forces did not allow for 
investigations or trials of foreign troops in the DRC. As described in Chapter III, these 
troops were accused of brutalizing the local population and of committing acts of murder, 
rape, criminal activities, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The speed with which 
the accords called for repatriating foreign fighters prevented them from being held 
accountable for these crimes.  
James-Emmanuel Wanki, in fact, argues that the DDRRR process sidelined the 
local population altogether, which not only led to a sense of injustice but also missed 
opportunities for learning more about various fighting groups. For example, Wanki 
argues that MONUC, by not being able to ally itself with the communities, failed to 
receive vital information from the local individuals on armed groups’ whereabouts, 
armament stores, and movements. In other words, MONUC and other agencies that 
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promoted the DDR process lacked comprehensive skills and support from local 
communities, which led to the failure of the program.173  
2. Insufficient Funds 
Another key obstacle to successfully executing the DDR programs in DRC, both 
in the short term and over time, was lack of funding. As described in Chapter III, the 
national demobilization programs offered two tracks: former combatants could choose 
between integrating into the national forces, and reintegrating into society. However, the 
funds allocated for these two tracks were unbalanced, with the majority of funds going 
towards demobilization—USD 200 million—and only USD 14 million for integration 
and army reform.174 This lack of funding greatly hindered security sector reform 
initiatives, which will be discussed in Section C. Insufficient funds also caused the DRR 
program to run out of money halfway through the proposed process and created gaps in 
services for those wishing to demobilize and those already demobilized.  
Wanki echoes these observations, stressing that the demobilization process was 
slow-paced, with multiple delays in payments and unfulfilled promises to those who 
chose reintegration into civilian life. He notes that hundreds of demobilized ex-soldiers 
demonstrated against delays in payments in the provinces of Kasenyi, Mahagi, 
Kwandroma, and Aveba.175 The slowed process of reintegration that resulted from lack 
of funds led to diminished trust in the DDR program and discouraged those who had 
joined the program; it most likely also deterred others from joining the DDR program as 
well.  
3. Overemphasizing Disarmament 
The overall objective of DDR is to support former combatants to be effective 
members of society and stop fighting. As described in Chapter II, literature on DDR 
stresses the importance of disarmament in this process, assuming that the presence of 
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weapons is a hindrance to peace and disarming individuals and groups is necessary for 
lasting stability. The DDR(RR) program and national DDR programs in the DRC 
followed this line of reasoning, making disarmament one of its top priorities. However, as 
described in Chapter III, efforts to disarm groups and individuals were unsuccessful. As 
mentioned in Chapter III, Section D, and Chapter IV, Section B, the DDR(RR) program 
only succeeded in disarming a reported 402 individuals.176 The PNDDR-led nationwide 
DDR program succeeded in disarming 186,000 individuals in the first phase and 12,820 
individuals in the second phase.177 In Ituri, between 9,000 and 12,500 combatants were 
disarmed.178 The total number of collected weapons for the national program is 
unknown, but, for the Ituri program, the figure was 6,200 weapons, of which 70 percent 
were old and unusable, suggesting that ex-combatants did not truly disarm.179 Ultimately, 
given the hundreds of thousands of armed individuals, the number of those who were 
disarmed is low.  
Several factors may have contributed to these low disarmament numbers. Seems 
like economic programs has to be made in order to improve security. But that poor 
security impedes other units of good governance and economic progress. A paradox of 
economic opportunity, low wages, and persisting insecurity may have discouraged the 
ex-combatants from returning functioning weapons and keeping them for future use. The 
enormity of the task and lack of success in disarming combatants in the DRC throws into 
question the focus on disarmament as a necessary path to peace. As will be proposed in 
the next section, it may be more worthwhile to focus instead on addressing the causes of 
insecurity, such as lack of jobs, insufficient and corrupt security forces, and ethnic-based 
grievances, rather than committing time and money to attempting to rid a conflict of 
weapons.  
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C. REINTEGRATION EFFORTS AND LONG-TERM SUCCESS 
As argued in Chapter II, reintegration is the most important stage in the DDR 
process for creating lasting peace, because it focuses on long-term efforts to fully return 
ex-combatants to civilian life. This stage often includes programs like vocational training, 
psychological care, and community-based reconciliation efforts. More broadly, three 
broad sectors need to be developed to achieve lasting success in DDR: law and justice; 
economic opportunity; and good relations with neighboring countries. In other words, 
reintegration requires greater resources and a more holistic approach for success. Each of 
these variables is considered in the following subsections.  
1. Law and Justice 
Perhaps one of the greatest obstacles to lasting peace in the DRC has been the 
lack of security sector reform throughout the country, particularly in the east, and how 
this has negatively affected law, order, and justice. Sean McFate, for example, stresses 
that DDR and security sector reform are symbiotic programs that are mutually 
reinforcing; thus, failure to address both simultaneously will most likely lead to failure. 
Improper reintegration of former combatants in the DDR process, for example, can 
complicate and compromise security sector reform. If they are done simultaneously and 
properly, however, a state can begin to provide its own security and uphold the rule of 
law, essential components in lieu of development as well as fixing fragile states. 
However, without addressing the larger issue of creating a safe and secure environment 
for all citizens, communities may resort to relying on local actors for their security, such 
as ethnic, religious, or community-based militias.180  
The DRC was unable to meaningfully change and develop its security sector, thus 
undercutting its DDR programs and state development. Autesserre, for example, stresses 
that the absence of authority in the eastern province, especially in the rural areas, created 
an environment conducive to citizens joining militias and armed groups for self-
protection. Furthermore, Autesserre notes that local government structures were corrupt, 
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further undercutting popular support of the government overall, including the security it 
provided.181 These factors contributed to the community hiding weapons for self-
protection from criminal gangs and government security forces. Under the supervision of 
traditional chiefs, communities organized local militia groups for protection, which 
weakened the progress of DDR programs. Thus, weak governance and lawlessness in 
eastern Congo created fertile conditions for the emergence of militia groups that 
threatened the security of the local population. 
A Human Rights Report echoes that government forces, in addition to militias and 
rebel groups, undermined law and order in the DRC. The report notes that, between 2012 
and 2014, non-state armed groups and Congolese armed forces in eastern Congo were 
responsible for kidnappings, killing civilians, committing rapes, burning homes, and 
enslaving children as soldiers. The armed forces used schools for military combat 
operations thereby preventing children from attending school for fear of being captured 
and forced to join these groups. The ADF, M23, Mai-Mai Kifuafua, Nduma defense of 
Congo, Nyatura, Raia Mutomoki, and Congolese armed forces all perpetrated these 
acts.182  
Ultimately, the perseverance of militias and illegally armed forces demonstrates 
the regime’s inability to provide security to its citizens, the breakdown of law and order, 
as well as the overall failure of the DDR programs. Persistence of violence and the 
presence of different armed groups have increased insecurity and confused the population 
about whom to rely on for their protection. Moreover, lack of security has forced people 
to flee conflict zones, creating additional problems of internally displaced people and 
their reduced engagement in economic activities.  
Despite these challenges, the DRC government, along with international agencies 
such as UNDP, did attempt to address issues of justice in DRR programs by supporting 
local communities and their efforts to accept ex-soldiers. Specifically, UNDP helped 
create community development and participation programs aimed at reducing tensions 
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between former soldiers and local communities and underscoring that both parties were 
the victims of fighting. For example, in Ituri district, UNDP used fishing cooperatives to 
integrate villagers and former combatants. This development project, which focused on 
demobilizing ex-combatants, benefited both ex-fighters and communities members and 
helped to motivate peace and harmony among them.183 
However, overall law and order have remained a critical problem for the DRC and 
have affected both its economic prospects and its relationships with its neighbors. 
2. Economic Development 
The DRC falls in the category of deprived nations globally, with the highest rates 
of poverty for the period of 2005 through 2012—during which the rate of poverty ranged 
from 71 percent to 63 percent, respectively—despite the progress in its economy and 
decline in poverty, according to the World Bank.184 Because the country’s economy is 
still weak, the vast majority of the population depends on self-employment activities to 
survive, such as informal employment activities and agricultural activities. Other sectors 
such as mining, manufacturing, and the service industry are not well established, 
although the potential for these sectors of the economy is enormous. Prolonged insecurity 
has affected the growth of the economy, foreign investment, and the development of the 
private sector.  
Equally importantly, the education infrastructure was destroyed during the war, 
and the government has yet to repair this vital aspect of the economy. As described in 
Chapter II, Section C, several scholars note the importance of investing in human capital 
for building capacity for citizens to engage in economic, social, and development 
activities for the well-being of the country and population.185 Within this broad goal, 
developing human capital and economic opportunity are critical for transforming ex-
combatants into productive citizens of society. The DRC and international donors appear 
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to have understood the importance of education for rehabilitating post-conflict society. 
Joanne Richards, for example, notes that the national DDR program created initiatives 
aimed at helping former combatants to return to civilian life by providing vocational 
training, schooling, agricultural activities, and other programs.186  
However, as described in the Section B of this chapter, the national DDR program 
ran out of funds in 2006 and was forced to close for over a year before being revived for 
one final year of operation. In total, the government committed around eight years of 
effort to reintegrating hundreds of thousands of ex-fighters to civilian life. Although the 
national programs included some unique economic projects, like the fishing cooperative 
mentioned previously, there was neither enough time nor money to create and sustain 
programs that would have given ex-combatants available alternatives to fighting. 
Moreover, the collapsed education system and fragile economy, exacerbated by chronic 
insecurity, have prevented the population from contributing to the country’s economic 
growth or individual economic security.  
3. Relationships with Neighboring Countries 
As described in Chapter III, following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, Hutus fled 
to the DRC and became another source of instability during the Congolese wars. The ex-
FAR/Interahamwe and FDLR military worked alongside Congolese foot soldiers during 
these wars, creating social bonds, business relationships, networks, and trust between the 
Congolese military and FDLR. The presence of Rwandan forces also created tensions 
with ex-FAR/Interahamwe and Hutus in the DRC, which became a lasting problem for 
security and stability in the DRC. In addition to Rwandan forces, the DRC also had to 
contend with other foreign troops on its soil, especially Ugandan forces, which required 
DDR(RR) programs aimed at their removal.  
As described in Chapter II, efforts aimed at removing and repatriating foreign 
forces from the DRC fell short of completely removing neighboring countries’ troops, 
particularly Rwandan forces. These shortcomings were the result of an unrealistically 
                                                 
186 Richards, “DDR in DRC: The Impact of Command and Control,” 3.  
 60
short time frame, lack of resources and infrastructure, insufficient number of government 
and MONUC forces, and no mechanisms for accountability.  
In October 2004, the United States initiated the formation of a tripartite joint 
commission among the DRC, Uganda, and Rwanda to build better relationships among 
these countries and to address foreign fighters in the DRC specifically. The DRC and 
Uganda signed the Ngurdoto Agreement in September 2007, which aimed to remove 
illegal rebel fighters that conduct military activities in both countries. This accord was 
followed by the Nairobi Communique in November 2007, an agreement between the 
DRC and Rwanda intended to enhance teamwork support in disarming, demobilizing, 
reintegrating, or repatriating external fighters such as FDLR, ex-FAR, and Hutu militias 
operating inside the DRC. In 2009, the Congolese government restored ambassadorial 
ties to Uganda, Burundi, and Rwanda, which led to bilateral talks and meetings between 
the DRC and each of these heads of state.187 
While these efforts to build better relations among the DRC, Uganda, and Rwanda 
are noteworthy, neighboring countries, particularly Rwanda, have continued to support 
rebel forces in the DRC. According to a Relief Web report, Rwanda aided the Congolese 
Tutsis who had deserted from the FARDC following a mutiny on April 4, 2012, to form 
the March 23 (M23) rebel group. The M23 became a political-military movement 
comprised of disgruntled Congolese Tutsi who were unified in the FARDC after the 
peace deal on March 23, 2009, but then deserted when promises went unfulfilled, 
including the government’s failure to protect the Tutsi population in North Kivu and its 
inability to dismantle the FDLR.188 A report from a UN group of experts publicized that 
the Rwanda regime, headed by the minister of defense James Kaberege, actually ran the 
M23.189 In March 2013, the UN passed Resolution 2098 that authorized the use of 
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offensive operations in eastern DRC to counter M23, and the rebel group was finally 
neutralized in November 2013.190 Clearly, more work is needed to build better 
relationships between the DRC and its neighbors, and to create mechanisms for removing 
foreign fighters from the DRC.  
D. RECOMMENDATIONS  
The protracted armed conflict in the DRC is the product of decades of poor 
governance, ethnic conflict, interference and spillover violence from neighboring states, 
other states’ interest in Congolese natural resources, insufficient and unprofessional 
security forces. Decades of insecurity have produced an array of illegally armed groups 
and militias with a variety of different goals. Given this complicated and lengthy history, 
creating a DDR program that truly reintegrates ex-combatants back into civilian life or 
integrates them with government forces requires a holistic approach that not only focuses 
on the fighter but also on society, the economy, and the government. And while this task 
is enormous, steps can be taken in the near term to help move the DRC in a better 
direction.  
This thesis concludes with several recommendations for DDR programs in 
general, and the DRC specifically. 
1. Think Long Term 
DDR is a long-term process and the goal should be the “R”—reintegration—
which creates the conditions for ex-combatants to take their place in society as productive 
and peaceful citizens. The temptation in DDR programs is to focus on demobilization and 
disarmament because these are short-term efforts and highly measurable; however, 
demobilization and disarmament are more measures of performance than they are 
measures of effectiveness. In the end, the goal should be to reintegrate ex-combatants 
into society and give them incentives to stay demobilized and possibly disarm over the 
long haul.  
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Demobilization, in other words, should be a step towards reintegration, not its 
own goal. As described in Chapter III, and as described previously in this chapter, 
hundreds of thousands of illegally armed individuals were demobilized in the DRC, but 
there is little evidence to suggest that these individuals stayed demobilized. Persistent 
insecurity, lack of jobs, and conflicts within local communities have prevented many of 
these individuals from moving beyond demobilization to reintegration. 
Similarly, focusing on disarmament does not guarantee reduced violence or 
stability. In countries that have had protracted conflict, weapons tend to be plentiful and 
focusing on removing all or most weapons from a conflict zone is time consuming, 
expensive, and ineffective. As the conflict in the DRC has shown, individuals chose to 
turn in old or non-functioning weapons, rather than truly disarm, thus rendering the 
disarmament program ineffective.  
Focusing on reintegration requires addressing a multitude of problems that go 
beyond just the illegally armed individual. Most notably, ex-combatants need to have a 
pathway to earning a living; without a job and the ability to provide for their families, 
fighters are unlikely to lay down their weapons. However, post-conflict countries often 
have weak economies and lack opportunities for individuals to earn a living. 
Furthermore, communities receiving ex-combatants need to be prepared for their return, 
and find mechanisms for reconciliation and rebuilding trust. Without the buy-in and 
acceptance of the local population, efforts at truly reintegrating ex-combatants are 
unlikely to succeed. 
Although the DDR programs in the DRC were largely unsuccessful, they offer 
clues for addressing these long-term reintegration challenges. The first national program 
attempted to create vocational training for ex-combatants, but ran out of money, which 
ended these efforts far too soon. International donors could focus on providing funding 
for job training over time. In particular, the focus could be on initiatives that aim to 
develop human capital, including the delivery of education, vocational training, farming 
skills, and so on, for the whole community, and not just for ex-combatants. This one 
effort—human capital development at the community level—could go far in transforming 
conflict zones and helping them become more economically productive and harmonious 
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spaces. In other words, development of human capital could be a vehicle for reintegrating 
former soldiers as well as rehabilitating communities.  
Similarly, jobs programs could be structured in such a way as to reintegrate ex-
combatants and work towards reconciliation with communities and societies. The 
UNDP’s fishing cooperatives in Ituri, for example, helped integrate villagers and former 
combatants through such an initiative. This development project, which focused on 
demobilizing ex-combatants, benefited both ex-fighters and communities members and 
helped to motivate peace and harmony in society. 
2. Think Holistically—DDR, Security Sector Reform, and Rule of Law  
Perhaps the greatest challenge with DDR programs is that they require 
commitment from other government institutions in order for these programs to be 
successfully carried out. As McFate and others argue, in a state attempting to end internal 
conflict, DDR and security sector reform need to happen simultaneously to address 
shortcomings in government security forces and adequately address illegally armed 
individuals and groups.191 In the case of the DRC, the country’s security forces were 
small, poorly equipped, and unprofessionally trained, greatly hindering their role in the 
DDR process. As noted, international donors only committed a tiny fraction of the money 
allocated for the DDR program to reforming the military of the DRC—USD 14 million 
versus USD 200 million for other aspects of the DDR program.192 Clearly, the 
international community did not see security sector reform as a priority.  
Furthermore, in addition to insufficient numbers of properly trained and equipped 
government forces, the UN mission in the DRC was unable to mobilize sufficient 
numbers of MONUC forces and deploy them quickly enough to help provide security and 
oversight of the DDR process. The result was a security vacuum in critical areas, 
particularly outside major cities, and an inability to successfully identify, repatriate, and 
demobilize foreign fighters as well as individuals and groups emanating from the DRC. 
The rushed timeline of the DDR programs, as described earlier, did not allow adequate 
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time to mobilize or deploy these forces, nor did it provide time to better train and 
professionalize DRC forces for the DDR mission.  
Alongside security sector reform, the rule of law should be considered as the 
fundamental ingredient in the overall DDR process. As described in Chapter III and 
previously in this chapter, the rule of law has all but disappeared in parts of the DRC as a 
result of protracted conflict and poor governance. In some provinces, government forces 
are as much a threat to the local population as are illegally armed individuals and groups. 
Under these conditions, it is an exceedingly difficult environment for the regime to 
control. Furthermore, the government is hindered from preventing the abuse of power by 
the security forces, establishing the rule of law, and building trust within the population. 
As the DDR programs in the DRC have shown, more time, money, and effort is 
needed for security sector reform and reestablishing the rule of law as part of an overall 
DDR program. As with development in human capital, this is a long-term focus that 
requires a considerable commitment of time and capital in order to achieve these 
necessary goals.  
3. Measures of Success 
The DDR programs in the DRC succeeded in demobilizing, disarming, and 
repatriating individuals, and collecting weapons. The first phase of nationwide DDR 
program, which ran from October 2004 to December 2006, succeeded in demobilizing 
102,014 individuals, disarming 186,000 individuals, and integrating 83,986 individuals 
into the national army.193 The second phase launched in July 2008 and completed in 
December 2009; this program succeeded in demobilizing 4,782 individuals, disarming 
12,820 individuals, and integrating 8,038 individuals into the national army.194 Alongside 
these national level DDR efforts, the government initiated a separate program in Ituri 
province, from September 1, 2004, to June 2005, which succeeded in demobilizing 
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between 9,000 and 15,811 individuals and collecting 6,200 weapons, of which 70 percent 
were old and unusable.195  
On its face, the number of individuals repatriated and demobilized is impressive 
and includes more than 200,000 combatants in total. However, these figures do not 
provide a true picture of the situation. In many cases, ex-combatants returned to fighting 
and joined other militant groups. Similarly, the number of weapons collected gives the 
impression of success, but the quality of the weapons reveals that efforts to disarm were 
unsuccessful. The next section will propose the right measures of success for the DDR 
program.  
With demobilization, disarmament, and repatriation, the numbers actually present 
measures of performance and not true measures of success. Measures of performance 
describe the effort put into trying to fix the problem, such as the amount of money spent, 
the number of patrols performed, or the number of bullets fired, but not the overall effect 
these efforts achieved. Similarly, the total number of demobilized, disarmed, and 
repatriated presented by the DDR program does not capture statistics on those that have 
returned to fighting or have purchased new weapons. Nor does it say anything about how 
many foreign fighters remain in the DRC.  
Ultimately, the goal of DDR programs is to return fighters to normal, productive 
roles in society, and to end violence and insecurity. This goal is long-range and dynamic; 
therefore, it requires regular monitoring over time, not just at one point in history. For 
better progress toward these goals, this thesis proposes the following measures of 
success: 
 The overall reduction of violence against civilians in the DRC. This 
would include collecting data on politically motivated violence, ethnic 
violence, criminal violence, violence instigated by government forces, 
reprisal violence, and any other violence that suggests an insecure 
environment. A lower level of violence in the DRC should indicate that 
the country is moving towards stability and security, and that the 
population could resume normal life in their traditional areas or 
communities.  
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 The number of individuals using the court system to resolve major 
disputes. This benchmark should reflect greater emphasis on the rule of 
law, and popular trust in the system and its ability to handle disputes 
justly. Numbers of individuals using the court system should be an 
indicator of a willingness to resolve major disputes by means other than 
violence. This number may also say something about the availability and 
accessibility of effectively functioning law enforcement, military, and 
judicial systems in the eastern part of the country. If the population is 
willing to rely on the legal system to resolve their disputes, it would signal 
that Congolese government has the capability to deal with disputes and 
promote the rule of law.  
 An overall reduction and eventual elimination of the number of 
militias and foreign or local armed groups in the DRC. A reduction in 
these forces demonstrates several important steps toward full 
reintegration. It may indicate that communities no longer feel the need to 
self-arm to protect themselves from the government and other forces, and 
the population’s “buy-in” to the rule of law and managing conflict through 
non-violent means. A reduction in illegally armed groups and individuals 
could also help strengthen the legitimacy of government institutions and 
reduce ethnic, tribal, and communal military influences on the population. 
 The economic health of the country and its employment opportunities. 
The economic health and job potential of the country should be measured 
at the local, regional, and national levels to gain an accurate picture of 
economic opportunity for individuals. Specific attention should be paid to 
the job potential for fighting age men and women, to assure that they have 
economic alternatives to fighting. Former combatants should also be 
monitored for job placement and their ability to find self-sustaining and 
fulfilling employment. The Congolese government could establish follow-
up teams at the community level to monitor the progress of the combatants 
and provide assistance, including job training and placement. This could 
be done on a monthly basis to assure that ex-combatants are being 
integrated at the village level.  
 The improvement of human security and physical security in the 
DRC. Human and physical security could be measured by the number of 
children attending primary and secondary schools, and college, reflecting 
that parents and children feel confident that they can attend school without 
fear of being abducted by militias or armed groups. Other measures of 
human security could include access to food and potable water, a 
reduction in infant mortality rates, and preventable disease reduction in the 
country. These metrics all point to the government’s ability to provide for 
the general welfare of its population across the country, and build trust 
between the population and the government.  
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The Democratic Republic of Congo has suffered from war and poverty for more 
than two decades. Given these protracted conflicts, the DRC now faces numerous 
challenges to establishing a stable state, including creating an effective democratic 
system, building infrastructure designed to support development (educational facilities, 
hospitals, roads); and strengthening security (border posts, police stations, courthouses, 
prisons), across the entire country. Despite the enormity of these tasks, the DRC can take 
steps in the near term aimed at working towards these long-range goals. A longer term, 
more comprehensive, and reintegration focused DDR program is an important step in this 
process, and one that financial institutions, donors, and nongovernmental organizations 
should continue to assist the Congolese government in order to help move the DRC 
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